Le Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative (CIREQ) regroupe des chercheurs dans les domaines de l'économétrie, la théorie de la décision, la macroéconomie et marchés financiers, la microéconomie appliquée et économie expérimentale et l'économie de l'environnement et des ressources naturelles. (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition, each agent chooses a favorite a object which is used as a tie-breaker if several projects receive the same highest aggregate bid. Since more desirable projects receive larger bids, it is natural to consider the multi-bidding mechanism without the announcement of favorite projects. We show that the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism appear not to be robust to this natural simplication. Specically, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are ecient.
I. Introduction
In many situations a group of agents has to choose a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is then implemented and the surplus is shared among the agents. Examples include the location of noxious facilities, the selection of a candidate or the siting of a major sports event. In a recent paper, P erez- Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose the multi-bidding mechanism to resolve such issues (with possibly conicting interests). The multi-bidding mechanism determines which project will be developed and how the agents will share the surplus from its development. The mechanism is described as follows: each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition each agent chooses a favorite project. The project with the highest aggregate bid is chosen as the winner. In case of a tie, the winning project is randomly chosen among those with highest aggregate bid and that are ranked rst by at least one agent. Two merits of the multi-bidding mechanism are (i) Nash equilibria always exist and (ii) in any Nash equilibrium an ecient project is carried out.
In real life (and in most auctions) usually agents place bids on projects without selecting a favorite project. When a naive or real-world planner is interested in applying the multi-bidding mechanism he will wonder why an agent needs to announce a favorite project in addition to his bids. Since the project with the highest aggregate bid is developed and more desirable projects receive larger bids, it seems natural that an agent's bids reveal his favorite project. In other words isn't the project on which an agent places his maximal bid his favorite project? The real-world planner considers to ask agents to submit bids only and interprets an agent's favorite project to be one with a maximal bid. Does this natural simplication aect the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism?
We demonstrate how crucial it is that agents also indicate separately one of their most favored projects. In the simpler mechanism, in which only bids are submitted, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if any project, which some individual views optimal, is ecient and there are at least two individually optimal projects. Furthermore, if a Nash equilibrium exists, then all merits of the multi-bidding mechanism carry over to the natural multi-bidding mechanism.
We proceed as follows. In Section II we introduce the environment and the natural multi-bidding mechanism. In Section III we give necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in the natural multi-bidding mechanism. In Section IV we discuss our ndings for environments having positive or negative externalities.
II. The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism
We consider a set of agents N = f1; : : : ; ng and a set of possible projects K = f1; : : : ; kg. The utility of agent i if project q is carried out is given by v i q P R.
The ecient projects are the projects which maximize the sum of the utilities of the agents. We denote by E the set of ecient projects, i.e.
The multi-bidding mechanism of P erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) determines the project which will be developed and how the agents share the surplus from its development. The mechanism is described as follows: each agent i announces k bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition i chooses a favorite project. The object with the highest aggregate bid is chosen as the winner. In case there is a tie, the winning project is randomly chosen among those with highest aggregate bid and which are favored by at least one agent. According to P erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002, p. 1578) the multi-bidding mechanism \in-troduces a measure of relative worth whereby more desirable projects receive larger bids". This motivates the following natural simplication of the multi-bidding mechanism. Each agent i submits k bids only, which sum up to zero, and does not select a 3 favorite project. The projects for which he submits a highest bid are interpreted to be his favored ones. The natural multi-bidding mechanism is described as follows: It is easy to check that the necessary conditions for a set of strategies to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) in the multi-bidding mechanism carry over to the natural multi-bidding mechanism.
Lemma 1 ( Lemma 5, P erez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) If b constitutes a NE of the natural multi-bidding mechanism, then the following three properties hold:
(a) The aggregate bid for every project is zero, i.e. for all q P K, B q = 0. (c) Any project on which some agent puts a maximal bid is ecient, i.e. M(b) E.
1 In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent is allowed to name exactly one favorite project. When an agent puts the same maximal bid on several projects, in the natural multi-bidding mechanism alternatively the planner may choose randomly a favorite project from those. This would not change the analysis. 2 Any sharing rule other than the equal sharing rule would generate the same results.
III. The Equilibrium Outcomes of the Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism
It will turn out that the individually optimal projects play the important role for deciding whether a NE of the natural multi-bidding mechanism exists or not. For each agent i we denote by O i = fq P K j v i q ! v i p for all p P Kg the projects that achieve highest utility for him. These are the projects that agent i views to be optimal. Let O = i2N O i denote the individually optimal projects.
Lemma 2 If b is a NE of the natural multi-bidding mechanism, then (i) the set of individually optimal projects coincides with the set of projects on which some agent Now we are ready to answer the question whether the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism are aected when interpreting an agent's favorite projects to be the ones with his maximal bids. When there are at least two individually optimal projects and any individually optimal project is ecient, then all merits of the multi-bidding mechanism carry over to the natural multi-bidding mechanism. If one of the two conditions is not met, then no equilibrium exists in the natural multi-bidding mechanism.
Theorem 1 If there are at least two individually optimal projects and any individually optimal project is ecient, then the natural multi-bidding mechanism implements in NE the set of utility vectors (2002) remains unchanged for the natural multi-bidding mechanism, the set of equilibrium outcomes is convex, and any extremal point of the set (1) is supported by a Nash equilibrium, we obtain the rst part of Theorem 1.
If there is one individually optimal project only or at least one individually optimal project is not ecient, then (c) of Lemma 1 and (d) of Lemma 3 cannot be satised simultaneously. Thus, by Lemma 3, no NE exists. £
IV. Discussion
We discuss our ndings when each project is associated with one agent. Therefore, in environments with positive externalities all projects are individually optimal and by Theorem 1 a NE exists only in the rare case when all projects are ecient. If the real-world planner adapts the natural multi-bidding mechanism, then all merits disappear. When siting a noxious facility the project imposes negative externalities on its associated agent. Then v i i is a negative number and v i q is a positive number if q T = i.
For example, suppose that a country has decided to build a nuclear plant. Then each region's utility increases with distance (the further the plant is located away, the better) and both the individually optimal regions and the ecient regions are located along the border of the country. If there is no agglomeration around the border, then a NE may exist. Theorem 1 puts severe restrictions on the existence of NE in the natural multibidding mechanism. In particular when one project is unambiguously ecient, then no equilibrium exists. The intuition is that if there are at least two individually optimal projects, then they need to be ecient and one can ensure that both projects receive zero in aggregate while any agent puts his maximal bid on one of the individually optimal projects (counter balanced by negative bids on the other individually optimal project(s)).
Our result also explains why in real life under complete information often no agreement is reached by bids and compensations (even if there is exactly one ecient
